The Islamization of Laws in Pakistan: The Case of Hudud Ordinances

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Pakistan has been in the grip of a raging debate on the issue of the Hudud Laws ever since they were introduced in 1979. There are some who ask for complete repeal of these laws, others who insist on keeping them as they are, and a third group calling for amending and reforming these laws to make them more responsive to human and social conditions.

Presented in this article is a dispassionate analysis of these so-called “controversial” laws for a better understanding of the actual situation in current day Pakistan.

This analysis is divided into three parts. The first part briefly discusses the importance of the injunctions of Islamic Shari'ah; the second part addresses the questions and doubts that are raised, furiously and frequently, about the Hudud Laws; and the last part focuses on those aspects that, to this author, are in need of review, amendment and reform.

Hudud and their place in Shari'ah

The importance of Shari'ah injunctions does not need to be impressed upon Muslims for the simple reason that when they profess the kalima, confirming the oneness of Allah and the prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him [pbuh]), they proclaim that they will observe Allah’s commands by following the example of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in all walks of life. Needless to say, these commands and teachings are not confined to acts of worship (ibadah) but cover all aspects of life — including criminal law, of which the Hudud Laws are a part.

The hudud are the penalties that the Qur’ān and Sunnah of the Prophet have prescribed for certain crimes. Notably, Islamic criminal law is quite lenient in this matter in that it prescribes punishments for only a few crimes. For all other crimes, there is no permanent prescription for specific punishments, and
the task of imposing punishments has been left to the ruler and the judge, i.e.,
the legislature and judiciary in modern society. It is these institutions that can
prescribe punishments for different crimes according to the demands of the
time and prevailing conditions. These punishments are called tazir\(^2\), while
those prescribed in the Qur'\assert and Sunnah are called hudud.

Theft, robbery, Zina (fornication, adultery and rape) false accusation and
drinking are crimes for which hudud have been prescribed.\(^3\) In Pakistan, the
Hudud Laws were enforced in 1979; ordinances regarding these crimes are
commonly referred to as the Hudud Ordinance.\(^4\)

Why immutable punishments were prescribed for these particular crimes
and not others, and why these too were not left to the discretion of the
legislature and the judiciary, is beyond this article’s purview. I would rather
limit myself to submitting that Divine Revelation insists on something only
where human intelligence is unable to act or vulnerable to mistake. So, the
issue is settled with a direct command contained in Revelation instead of being
left to human intelligence. Whether one — an individual or a people —
understands the wisdom behind the command or not, it is binding in all
circumstances. In such situations, compliance with the command accrues
invisible yet not totally imperceptible benefits, though the chain of cause and
effect remains beyond human discernment. Perhaps this is the case with
hudud as well.

This underscores the importance of the enforcement of hudud in an
Islamic state. It is understandable that there can be different views with respect
to setting priorities in the formidable task of transforming an entirely non-
Islamic legal system into an Islamic system. However, there cannot be two
views about the importance of enforcement of hudud.

**The Hudud Laws and Islamization debate in Pakistan**

It is true that hudud laws are only one element of the Islamic legal system;
in other words, the Islamic legal system is not solely about hudud. Besides
providing legal means for discipline, Islam also provides non-legal teachings
for the reform of society, which greatly help in curbing crimes. This implies
that an Islamic state cannot absolve itself of its duties by just enforcing the
hudud; it is also responsible for creating an atmosphere that discourages the
incidence of crime in the first place. However, this does not provide sufficient
grounds for the objection sometimes raised that it is unjust to enforce Sharī’ah
laws consisting of harsh punishments in a society where no other thing is
Islamic and where media encourages waywardness in our youth. Building on
this objection, some even say that unless all the sources that instigate violence
and crime are eliminated and until a model Islamic society is established, laws
like the Hudud Ordinances should not be introduced.
This objection is unreasonable. For one thing, there is no doubt that the very enforcement of hudud in letter and spirit plays a significant role in creating such an environment, and it is therefore not right to postpone their enforcement until the establishment of such an environment. Moreover, it must be appreciated that the establishment of a model Islamic society is an onerous task, and it would be impossible to assess when a society had become “sufficiently Islamic” for enforcing hudud. The model society that Islam seeks to establish is an ideal that requires continuous and unflinching struggle to be realized. Laws are made and enforced to curb evil and to move society closer to the ideal; the Hudud Ordinance seeks to serve this purpose.

The criticism that harsh punishments of death and lashing are uncalled for in prevailing conditions, which consist of too many temptations, offers no solution to the problem. Instead of being scrapped altogether, the law should be improved to effectively check the spread of evil in society.

It is important to note that the Hudud Ordinances are not “static.” It is for the courts to decide each case, keeping in view specific details, the context in which the crime took place, as well as the condition of the accused. In Shi'a, even a small plausible doubt suffices to annul hadd punishments. The importance of this condition can be gauged from the fact that no accused has been awarded a hadd punishment since 1979; all of those convicted were given tazir punishments. This underlines the reasoning that instead of waiting for society to become Islamic (as if this would come about by some stroke of magic!) before enforcing Islamic laws, the wise course would be to continue with the Islamization of laws as a step towards Islamizing society.

Before proceeding further, it needs to be realized that whereas the laws ordained by Allah and His Prophet are sacred and there is no room for doubts about it, when these laws are codified, that code of law represents human effort, which is not infallible, but susceptible to mistake. The drafting of any law is a very delicate undertaking. All possible situations have to be kept in mind and provided for in words. Since human intelligence, being limited, cannot visualize all kinds of circumstances in advance, there is always the possibility of flaws and weaknesses in any piece of law. The Hudud Ordinances are no exception. They may suffer from weak drafting. They may contain some aspects that are in need of review and improvement. Without changing the injunctions of Shari‘ah as commanded by Allah and enforced by His Prophet, the process of change and improvement in its implementation can theoretically go on forever, as indeed it should. Of course, this process should be guided by objective critique and not hostility.

It is unfortunate that polarization has kept the doors shut for such an objective approach. Whenever a proposal concerning some issue is raised on the political level, people divide into two camps: while one fails to see any
good in it and calls for its total repeal, the other fails to notice any flaw in it and deems it heretical to even think about amending it. This is what is happening in the case of the Hudud Ordinances also.

There is a group that instead of undertaking a critical analysis is raising unfounded objections against the Hudud Ordinances. These people, many of whom are in fact against the very concept of enforcement of any Islamic injunction as a law, are not ready to accept anything less than its annulment. They represent the secular mindset that holds that religion is a private matter between man and his God and should not interfere in the affairs of the state. An added factor that has lent stiffness to their opposition to Hudud Laws is that these laws top the list of Islamic injunctions that are the target of many circles in the West as well. Thus, they can be expected to oppose the Ordinances tooth and nail, no matter how flawless they become or how pristine a shape they assume.

The dilemma facing these people is that they cannot openly say in a Muslim society, which Pakistan’s is, that Islamic laws are not acceptable to them. So they adopt an indirect approach. Instead of raising objections against Islam or its legal system, they find fault with the man-made drafted laws. In the case of the Hudud Ordinances, they have deemed it most useful to term them “anti-women.” This is how they try to raise the concern of the international community and solicit its support for their political ends.

Some Critical Issues

Harshness of the Hadd Punishments: Much hue and cry has been raised against the harshness of the hadd punishments. In any action, it is human psychology to compare prospects of profit against possibilities of loss, and opportunities against dangers. If the prospects of profit are greater than the danger of loss, one goes ahead; if not, one refrains from the undertaking. In committing crimes, similarly, one is lured by a temptation but deterred by the prospect of punishment. If in one’s reckoning the pleasure of the crime exceeds the pain of punishment, one may commit it; but if the deterrence is greater than the urge, one would be more likely to refrain. Shari’ah has prescribed punishments keeping in view this law of the human psyche and nature. The more heinous the crime the harsher the punishment so that society is purged of its wicked and depraved elements.

As for the “brutality” of the punishment of stoning to death (the Hadd punishment for adultery and rape), it should be realized that it is in fact a kind of death sentence. In numerous laws around the world, many crimes incur a death sentence that may be administered through various forms, such as hanging, decapitation, the gas chamber, electric shocks, injection, bullet-fire or stoning.
The methods are different but the punishment is the same. It is therefore not so relevant to debate that a bullet kills instantly and with greater efficacy, while stoning protracts the incidence of death. At times a bullet misses its mark and death is delayed, while a stone hits its point and results in instant death.

In any case, the argument that death should be swift goes against the purpose of this punishment: without its ‘torment’ and gravity, the sentence of death would lose much of its meaning. This is borne out by the fact that people are not afraid of death as much as they are of undergoing the agony of death.

Aside from plain logic, if those who are worried about the death sentence for adultery consult the statistics, they would see that cases of death on account of adultery are fewer than half of the deaths in other cases. While no one can condone killing in the name of honor, the current situation in our society is that when a man finds his wife, sister or daughter in a “compromising relationship” with someone, he himself kills her along with the paramour. At times, the methods employed for the murder of the wrongdoers are even more drastic and severe than stoning to death. So the punishment of stoning to death is a pragmatic realization of the actual situation and a measure to rectify it, along with providing a better system for the elimination of crimes.

Similarly, to say that the punishment of lashes (Hadd punishment for fornication, drinking and false accusation) is against human dignity is itself against the dictates and demands of respect for humanity. If a person ignores his or her own dignity and impinges on others’, why shouldn’t there be a punishment that forces him or her to correct this behavior? To punish one or two for their wrongdoing in order to deter other criminal-minded elements and to protect the rest is better than letting criminals get away with their crimes and morally harm the social fabric.

**Discriminatory against women:** It is said that the Hudud Ordinances are discriminatory to women, that they have made women victims of all kinds of injustices and that they have been handed down punishments for wrongs they have not committed. This view has been repeated ad nauseam until even neutral elements have become suspicious about the purpose of the Ordinances.

There is one clause in the Zina Ordinance — clause 8(b) about women’s witness — of which it can be said that there is discrimination between men and women. Yet not a single woman has ever been punished on the basis of this clause, nor has it made any significant difference in practical terms. This issue is discussed later in this article, but what needs to be stressed here is that the allegation of discrimination against women is totally baseless with respect to the other clauses of this Ordinance. This allegation is leveled by those who have not studied the laws and their implications and amounts to giving such
meanings to the laws just to oppose it though they are not even intended. This has led to ridiculous situations. The following two examples expose the true depth of such allegations.

The Qazf Ordinance is one of the Hudud Laws. Qazf means leveling a false accusation in hadd cases. The intent of the law is that if one is accused falsely of committing a crime liable to hadd, one can seek punishment from the court against the false accuser. Shari‘ah has declared such crime highly serious and has prescribed a punishment of 80 lashes for this. The Qazf Ordinance is there to enforce this punishment. Clause 8(a) states who can file a complaint of Qazf:

If the person in respect of whom the Qazf has been committed is alive, that person or any person authorized by him . . .

It is the use of the word “him” here that has become the bone of contention. It is an established rule of law in Pakistan that the masculine pronoun is inclusive of both men and women. This is the situation with most of the laws of the world. But since this Ordinance had to be condemned as “anti-women,” its opponents picked the issue of a pronoun to claim that it allows only men to file complaints.

If such allegations come from some ignorant people — those who do not understand legal language — their otherwise baseless protests are understandable. But, surprisingly, this objection was raised by the National Commission on the Status of Women, which was appointed to review the Ordinances and included legal experts. Its comment on section 8(a) of the Qazf Ordinance is:

It is obvious from the wording used in this clause that the drafters of this law overlooked and completely ignored women . . . excluding the term ‘her’ means that it is only a man against whom Qazf is committed is eligible to file a complaint.

This was done to indicate that the Ordinance is discriminatory, allowing men to approach the courts for redress against false charges of illicit relations but not women. The blatant bias in this charge becomes even clearer when one considers that Clause 2(b) of the Qazf Ordinance says that Pakistan’s Penal Code is applicable here — and Clause 8 of the Pakistan Penal Code clearly states:

The person ‘he’ and its derivatives are used for any person, whether male or female.

The second example of a baseless charge pertains to the Zina Ordinance. Clause 5(1)(a) of the Zina Ordinance attempts to define the crime of Zina in the following terms:
**Zina** is liable to *badd* if it is committed by a man who is an adult and is not insane, with a woman to whom he is not, and does not suspect himself to be, married.

Here, the objection raised is that while the word “adult” has been used for a man, it has not been used for a woman. The reason, however, is clear. If a man who has committed *Zina* is not an adult, *badd* cannot be imposed on him; if an adult man has committed the crime against a woman, whether adult or not, *badd* can be imposed on him. Not setting the condition of adulthood for the woman ensures that *badd* is imposed on a man who has raped any woman, whether she is an adult or a minor.

In this context, the recommendation of the National Commission on the Status of Women that, “As the term ‘adult’ has been used for a man, it should also have been used for a woman,” is strange indeed. It means that the crime would be liable to *badd* only when an adult man has committed it against an adult woman; if an adult man has committed the same heinous crime against a minor girl, he would go scot-free. Clearly, the existing definition of *Zina* and its *badd* in the *Zina* Ordinance ensures more rights for women than the draft recommended by the Commission.

The above two examples ably expose the depth of the allegations as well as the mindset of those against the *Hudud* Ordinances. A similar example can be found in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women, which says that different clauses of the Ordinances are used against women and they are booked in false *badd* cases for personal reasons. Some 80–90 percent of female prisoners are facing cases under these Ordinances and languishing in jails. This is factually wrong, as the statistics given below indicate.

### Women Indicted in Various Cases during September 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Jail</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cases of Murder</th>
<th>Cases of Narcotics</th>
<th>Cases of Hudood</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adiala Jail</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kot Lakhpat</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jail Lahore</td>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Jail</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>502</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |        | **23%**         | **28%**            | **31%**         | **17%**       |


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Women Indicted in Various Cases in NWFP during July 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Jail</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cases of Murder</th>
<th>Cases of Narcotics</th>
<th>Cases of Hudood</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ismail</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansehra</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbottabad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above statistics show that the allegations that Hudud Ordinances are used against women and that 80–90 percent of women prisoners are facing cases under these Ordinances and languishing in jails are untrue.

Misuse by law enforcement agencies: Since the clauses of the Criminal Code (1898) also apply to the Zina Ordinance under its Clause 20, the same procedure is observed from the filing of a case to its investigation and hearing. The Ordinance does not give a different or separate system or procedure. The problem lies in giving police unlimited and arbitrary powers. The police play the same role in hadd cases as they do elsewhere: in matters of bribery, mafiahood, injustice and oppression of the common man. The wrongdoings of the police are counted as the flaws in the Ordinances. This is another reason why the Hudud Ordinances attract severe criticism.

Carrying out raids of private homes, checking passers-by for nikah forms (marriage registration), arresting — especially women — on the basis of mere doubt, and treating the victim as the accused all speak of highhandedness on the part of police. There is no room for this in Shari’ah. Then, while Clause
173 of the Criminal Code stipulates 15 days for the completion of the investigation, the police in fact do not complete it for months and at times even years lapse without progress in cases. Challans are not sent, at least on time, to the courts. Witnesses that the police present before the court do not take an interest in the cases: they fail to present themselves before the courts on time and sometimes do not respond to the courts’ summons. These are among causes of delay in *hadd* cases. The need, therefore, is to reform the police rather than do away with the law.

Another problem is that the entire system, not just the *Hudud* Ordinances, has been manipulated for the benefit of the influential and wealthy in our society. The laws are used to subjugate the already oppressed and weaker elements in society. So rather than scrapping the Ordinances, the solution lies in their enforcement in letter and spirit.

Here, an important aspect is that the Criminal Code has been kept outside the purview of the Federal Shari‘at Court (FSC). This is why the FSC has not been able to give suggestions for removing its flaws and weaknesses. It would not be wrong to say that it is the Criminal Code of 1898 that has failed rather than the *Hudud* Ordinances.

**(Rape victims are booked in fornication crimes):** Before the introduction of the *Zina* Ordinance, the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC 375 and 376) held it a crime if a man raped a woman against her will, i.e., *Zina bil-jabr*. However, it was not a crime if he committed it with her consent, *Zina bil-raza*. This amounted to a mockery of the law: a man could not marry another woman without the consent of his wife, since it was a crime, but could commit adultery with any other woman because it was not a crime if committed with the consent of that woman. The Ordinance attempted to remove this discrepancy and declared *Zina bil-raza* a crime.

Those who were in favor of the old Anglo-Saxon law and did not want to declare *Zina bil-raza* a crime faced a problem. They could not say openly that *Zina bil-raza* should be allowed. Instead, they pursued their objective under the banner of “Elimination of Discrimination against Women” and held that victims of rape (*Zina bil-jabr*) do not report crimes against them for fear of being themselves booked for *Zina bil-raza*. Many women who are in fact victims of rape, it was claimed, are languishing in jails while the men who violated them are roaming free!

Although this claim has been made repeatedly, the real situation is quite the opposite.

In my own experience of hearing cases concerning the *Hudud* Ordinances, first as a judge in the Federal Shari‘at Court (FSC) and then in the Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, I did not come
across even a single case where a woman had filed a complaint of Zina bil-jabr but had instead been punished for Zina bil-raza.

A case that became well known in this regard was the Safia Bibi case. She was a 21-year-old girl (wrongly reported in some newspapers as 13 years old), with a 9-month pregnancy. Her own father had registered a case that she had committed Zina. When arrested, she said that a man had committed Zina against her will. When she could not prove her case, the trial court announced imprisonment for three years for Zina bil-raza. But the case was appealed before the Federal Shari'at Court, which observed that when a woman had complained of rape against her, the hadd of Zina cannot be imposed on her merely on the grounds that she was pregnant. Setting aside the sentence, the FSC acquitted her.12

It was this case that was used to say that women victims of rape were booked in crimes they did not commit! What needs to be noted is that it was not the girl who filed the case of her rape, it was her father who had in fact registered a case against her and it is no insignificant matter in Pakistani society that a father should register a case against his own daughter. Yet, when the case progressed and the girl said that she had been raped, the court acquitted her on the basis of her statement.

There may have been some incidents that did not come to my knowledge, but almost 90 percent of the hundreds of cases of kidnapping and rape that I heard during some 18 years as a judge resulted in punishment for the male offenders while the women went free. This was the situation even in cases where a woman had eloped with her paramour and had insisted, as long as she remained with him, that she went out with and got married to him of her own free will. However, when her parents managed to find her, she said she was kidnapped and raped. The accused man, on the other hand, defended himself by saying that the woman went with him of her free will and wanted him to marry her. Since he failed to furnish sufficient proof of the marriage, he received the punishment, but the woman was given the benefit of the doubt and was set free.

This is the view of other judges as well. Given the fact that elopement has not been declared an offense, they have taken a lenient view in favor of women. This is why it is men who receive punishment while women are acquitted.

The findings of the research of American scholar Dr. Charles Kennedy are also worth sharing in this regard. Dr. Kennedy stayed in Pakistan and carried out a survey of cases under the Hudud Ordinances over a period of five years from 1980 to 1984. He writes: “Women fearing conviction under section 10(2) frequently bring charges of rape under 10(3) against their alleged partners. The FSC finding no circumstantial evidence to support the latter charge convict the
male accused under section 10(2) ... the woman is exonerated of any wrongdoing due to ‘reasonable doubt’ rule.” The following table gives the findings of the survey regarding the gender distribution of convictions.

**Conviction by Gender, 1980–84**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime•</th>
<th>District Courts</th>
<th>Federal Shari'at Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10(2)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10(3)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina (All)</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Zina</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• 10(2) = adultery; 10(3) = rape; 11 = kidnapping; 12 = sodomy; 14 = conspiracy to engage in prostitution; 16 = enticement; 18 = attempted rape; 19 = abetment of Zina crime; 5 = adultery liable to hadd; 15 = deceitful marriage.

* Figures in parentheses refer to relevant percentages.


Studying the impact of 10(2) about Zina bil-raza, the survey found that the lower courts handed down punishments to 145 men and the FSC maintained punishments in 71 cases, while the court upheld punishments in the case of just 30 women. In other words, only 30 women were given punishments. This is how jails are swelling with women!

As for 10(3) about Zina bil-jabr, the lower courts punished 63 men and only 2 women. The FSC upheld the punishment in 59 cases for men, and quashed the punishment of the 2 women. This means that no woman was punished under this section during the five years of the study.

**False accusation and Qazf:** An objection against the *Hudud* Ordinances is that under Clause 8(b), the *Qazf* Ordinance requires a raped woman to present four witnesses against the accused. If she fails to do so, she is held for leveling a false accusation (*qazf*) against the rapist.14
The reality, however, is that there is neither such a likelihood under the Ordinance nor has it ever happened. The Qazf Ordinance clearly says that a woman who files a case of rape (Zina bil-jabr) but fails to prove her accusation will not be awarded a Qazf hadd, as Clause 3 of the Qazf Ordinance maintains that:

It is not Qazf to refer in good faith an accusation of Zina against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person . . .

There are, however, three exceptions:

(a) A complaint makes an accusation of Zina against another person in a court, but fails to produce four witnesses in support thereof before the court;
(b) According to the finding of the court, a witness has given false evidence of the commission of Zina or Zina-bil-jabr;
(c) According to the finding of the court, the complainant has made a false accusation of Zina-bil-jabr.

Second Marriage of Divorced Women: Another objection that is leveled against the Zina Ordinance with vehemence is that it punishes even those women who marry a second time after being divorced and having completed the period of iddah, when their ex-husbands register cases of Zina (adultery) against them under the Ordinance’s clause 10(2).

However, the fact of the matter is that women have to face difficulties because of Clauses 6 & 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO), promulgated during the Ayub era in 1961, prior to the introduction of the Hudud Ordinances. It was laid down in the MFLO that divorce would be effective only when the husband had also sent a notice of divorce to the chairman of the union council. In other words, she would legally remain his wife if he had not notified the union council about their divorce. This clause actually conflicts with Sharī’ah, under which notification of divorce does not need to be sent to any official authority to be effective. Without any such notice, the woman comes out of wedlock and is free to marry any other person after completing the period of iddah. So it was the MFLO that was said to protect the rights of women, that made it difficult for women to marry a second time after being divorced because of ill-will and delay on the part of their former husbands and gave them a pretext to file cases of adultery against their ex-wives after they had divorced them.

The Zina Ordinance in fact attempted to rectify this situation. Clause 494 of the Pakistan Penal Code prescribed, much before the introduction of this Ordinance, seven years imprisonment for a woman for getting married to another man while being married to her husband. Malignant husbands could easily exploit this clause and in fact did register cases to have their former...
wives punished after they had divorced them. The *Zina* Ordinance brought about two changes in this regard. First, Pakistan Penal Code’s Clause 494 took the shape of Clause 10(2) in the Ordinance with a sentence of 4–10 years. Setting a sentence that might vary from 4 to 10 years reflects an appreciation of the different circumstances under which the same crime might be committed. Secondly, when such cases were brought before the Shari’at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, it ruled that a woman could not be established as guilty of committing *Zina* (adultery) merely on this “technical” ground (that her husband had not notified the authorities about their divorce). With this decision from the Appellate Bench, the door for misuse of Clause 10(2) of the *Hudud* Ordinance was effectively shut. However, it is a fact that persistence of Sections 6 & 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance read with Section 494 in the Pakistan Penal Code continues to provide room for harassing those women who are divorced but still face cases filed against them by their former husbands.

**Rape v/s adultery (and Fornication):** Yet another objection that certain quarters raise against the *Zina* Ordinance is that it does not distinguish between *Zina* bil-jabr (rape) and *Zina* bil-raza (adultery and fornication), although the former is more heinous and therefore warrants harsher punishment than the latter.

This objection is untenable. The Shari’ah approach is more sophisticated. As logic would dictate, it does prescribe different punishments for rape and adultery or fornication. In other words, in addition to acknowledging the difference between the two situations, Shari’ah also takes into account the conditions under which the crime is committed.

If the committer is married (*muhsan*), then the *badd* of *rajm* (stoning to death) is the punishment — whether he committed rape or conducted sexual intercourse with his partner’s consent. Since a married man accused of adultery is condemned to death, there can obviously be no harsher punishment.

If he is unmarried (and does not fall within the definition of *muhsan*), the *badd* punishment for consensual sex is 100 lashes while in the case of rape (*Zina* bil-jabr) the court can give (under Clause 6(3) of the *Hudud* Ordinance) any other punishment — including death — besides the 100 lashes.

There is also a great difference between *tazir* punishments for rape and consensual sex, as laid down in Clauses 10(2) and 10(3) of the *Hudud* Ordinance.

**Punishment to Minors:** Clauses 5 and 10 of the *Zina* Ordinance, which provide that a sane and adult person guilty of committing *Zina* would face punishments prescribed in these clauses, are objected to for two reasons. Firstly, most of the girls in Pakistan reach puberty at the age of 8–9 years.
Although they are physically adolescents at this stage, they are in no way mentally mature enough to fully understand the gravity of the crime and its implications. It is, therefore, unjust to punish them. Secondly, as girls reach puberty sooner than boys, they become eligible for punishment earlier. This is a kind of discrimination against women.

It should be realized here that the purpose of a law is not to punish the accused as much as to prevent the causes of crime in a society. The more a law succeeds in preventing and checking the rate of crimes, the more comprehensive it would be.

It is a reality that when a boy or a girl attains puberty, s/he becomes able to act on sexual desires. There should be some law that can prevent them from committing the crime. If there were no such law in the country, it would only point to a flaw in the legal system.

As for the fact that girls attain puberty earlier than boys, giving them exceptions cannot be made a general principle, since this may end up putting minors in the hands of criminals. However, the courts should — as indeed they do — ascertain the mental health of the accused to determine whether some concession or even exception can be made.

**Women’s witness:** As noted earlier, there does exist a clause in the *Zina* Ordinance — Clause 8(b) — that differentiates between men and women. This is about women’s witness in *hadd* cases. The Ordinance stipulates that witnesses against an accused in a *hadd* case should all be men. Here, the following points need to be kept in mind:

First, this differentiation between men and women is only for *hadd* cases, not those that come under *tazir*. In *tazir* cases, women’s witness is not only acceptable but the accused can even be punished on the basis of her witness if “circumstantial evidence” corroborates it. This is what has in fact happened. Now, the factual position is that more than 99 percent of cases registered under the *Zina* Ordinance come under *tazir*; while the number of *hadd* cases during the last 20–25 years can be counted on the fingers where, according to my knowledge, only one *qazf hadd* has been issued. So, in sum, non-recognition of women’s witness in *hadd* cases has not made any real difference in practical terms.

Second, in light of the Qur’ānic verse “Get two witnesses out of your men, and if there are not two men then a man and two women,”20 a woman’s witness is counted as half of a man’s. While scholars have attempted to understand the reason and wisdom behind this injunction, such as the biological factors and the differences of men’s and women’s roles in society, in my view, while we should try to research and understand the logic and wisdom behind all the Divine teachings and commandments, it is essentially a
matter of faith. It is not necessary for a Qur’anic command to be implemented that we first fully understand its wisdom. Being Muslims, believing in the truth that is Qur’an, we submit to Allah’s command, whether we comprehend its full wisdom or fail to understand the wisdom behind it.

There is another fine point here. A majority of scholars have observed that this verse of Al Baqarah creates a technical ground for doubt with regard to women’s witness, which in turn provides enough reason for not handing down a harsh punishment to the accused. This is in keeping with the spirit of Sharia injunctions and the purpose of prescribing a whole system of punishments for various crimes. Whereas Sharia has prescribed harsh punishments for hadd crimes, it also has laid down strict conditions that have to be met before handing them out to the accused person. The Holy Prophet’s instruction is to avoid hadd punishments as far as possible. They are there to maintain deterrence against crime, rather than to victimize people. This is why hadd punishments have been stopped from being carried out in many cases on the basis of even small doubts. Although the accused are given “the benefit of the doubt” and acquitted according to the general rule of law, in hadd cases, this goes beyond “plausible doubt” and hadd punishment is not given on the basis of mere technical grounds.

Yet some fuqaha (Muslim jurists) among the tabi’ie (the generation of Muslims that came after the generation of the Companions of the Prophet) have observed that in keeping with the criteria for women’s witness as laid down in Al Baqarah, women’s witness can be accepted in hadd cases as well. Therefore, there is room for further investigation, deep thinking and research on this subject. While a learned discourse on this delicate issue can be initiated, this can never become an excuse for scrapping the entire Hudud Ordinance, as some circles aspire.

Some Submissions

Aspects of the Hudud Ordinances that are in my view in need of review are discussed below:

According to my understanding of the teachings of Qur’an and Hadith, I find no ground for “Zina liable to tazir.” Zina is either liable to hadd, or it is not zina. So, there is no justification in declaring a person a criminal if the hadd of Zina cannot be applied to him or her. The existing situation is that when conditions for hadd punishment are not fully met, a tazir punishment is awarded to the accused. Since in such a case the crime cannot be termed Zina but a lesser crime, this flaw needs to be removed from the Zina Ordinance.

Not only should the accused be acquitted on the basis of “benefit of the doubt” under Clauses 5 and 10 of the Zina Ordinance, but the court should
also ascertain whether the allegation was false. If it turns out to be false, the
court should award a *qazf* punishment to the individual who filed the false case.
It should not wait for the wrongfully accused person to file this case. In fact,
courts should prescribe appropriate punishments for filing false cases in general.
This would check the tendency to file false cases for the sake of harassment.

The standard of *tazkiyat-u shubud*\(^{21}\) has been prescribed for witnesses for
all punishments under the Ordinance. This means that the court would
examine whether they meet the criteria for witness or not. However, the
Ordinance does not identify a procedure by which to ascertain the validity of
witnesses. In Islamic states of the past, *tazkiyat-u shubud* was carried out
through an institutional process. There used to be *muzakki* (those who
ascertain) with the courts. But this institution is non-existent now, nor is it easy
to institute it in the prevailing corrupt atmosphere. Therefore, there is a need
to have some alternative arrangement to ascertain the standard of truthfulness
and veracity of witnesses. Since there is no such thing in the *Zina* Ordinance,
the courts attempt to observe the criteria for *tazkiya* as far as possible and as
they understand it. This leads, at times, to very odd situations.

In my personal view, I think that during the cross-examination (*jarh*) of
witnesses the other party can raise such questions that may meet the standard
of *tazkiya*. A more comprehensive system where opponent parties can raise
questions about the integrity and truthfulness of witnesses may fulfill the
purpose of *tazkiyat-u shubud*. Scholars, legal experts and court officials
should ponder this and explore instituting a better system.

Shari‘ah does want to ensure that the harsh punishments in *hadd* cases are
imposed as little as possible, and this is why it has laid down strict criteria in
these cases. But this does not mean that *hudud* become totally irrelevant. In
this regard, too, there is a need to ascertain what the conditions in *Hudud*
Laws are that are not ordained (*nass*), yet come in the way of imposition of
*hadd* punishments.

In addition to legislation about the *hadd* crimes, the *Hudud* Ordinances
also provide legislation for other crimes. They also prescribe quite lengthy and
harsh punishments for these crimes. What has happened is that many *tazir*
crimes that previously came under purview of the Penal Code have been
included in the Ordinances but with larger sentences. It is not the aim of
Shari‘ah that people should undergo long jail terms while their families suffer
and face hardship in their absence. With its system of prisons, Shari‘ah seeks
to curtail the rate and spread of crime and bring about rectification. It also
seeks to reform the individual who has committed a crime. It does not aim to
make his relatives suffer for his sin. Muslim jurists have gone to the extent of
observing that if one is given a long sentence, there should be “intervals” so
that one may meet with family members and fulfill their needs.
Conclusion

It is clear that the Hudud Laws are but a small part of Islamic teachings. They do not make up the “whole Islam.” Enforcement of these laws is a stage in the process of Islamizing society, not the final aim. Thus, there is a need to introduce comprehensive and well-coordinated reforms in other sectors of society, including education, economy, civil administration, enforcement of law, and the role of courts. It is unfortunate that the Islamization process could not move beyond promulgation of the Hudud Laws as planned. Needless to say, this did not produce the desired results. Since this all-inclusive, multifaceted reform process could not continue, some people say, the laws should be scrapped. But this is ludicrous reverse logic. If one step is taken in the right direction, it should not be retracted just because the next step is not taken. The right approach, instead, is to take the next step so that the former becomes more effective.

Our legal system prescribes punishments for all crimes, but due to weaknesses in the process of investigation as well as in the courts, the crime rate is increasing rather than decreasing. New laws are introduced to curb drug-trafficking, yet the menace is not becoming less virulent. This does not mean that we should do away with the laws that were intended to uproot the problem. Instead, it calls for reforming the system from investigation to pursuance in courts. On the same grounds, the view that Hudud Laws should be scrapped merely because they have not produced the desired results so far is absurd. Rather, we should strive for reform in the system within which they operate.

There is a need to avoid taking extreme positions and instead appreciate the efforts of Islamization in the context of this indigenous culture, the current situation and the challenges of modern times. Only in this spirit can we move ahead removing the flaws in the existing laws and integrating them with other sectors.

Endnotes

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1. The punishments prescribed in the Qur’ân and Hadith for crimes of Zina (fornication, adultery and rape), false accusation, theft and drinking are called hudud (singular hadd).

2. Any punishment other than hadd, imposed by an Islamic state for a crime.


4. First promulgated on 10 February 1979, the Hudud Ordinance was later indemnified by the Parliament as part of the Eighth Amendment in the Constitution in 1985.


7. The *Qazf* Ordinance is one of the ordinances collectively known as the Hudud Ordinance.


15. See for example, Case of Allah Dad vs. Mukhtar (1992 SCMR 1273).

16. Sections 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) binds a husband to obtain written permission from his existing wife to contract another marriage while under Section 7 it is mandatory for him to intimate the Nazim Union Council/Chairman Arbitration Council about the repudiation of the marriage. Since in most of the cases, this legal procedure is not followed and wicked people take benefit of it by falsely implicated their ex-wives in adultery cases if they remarry at any point of time. For details, see S. A. Abid, *Encyclopedia of Family Laws in Pakistan*, Shan Book Corporation, 1-Turner Road. Opp. High/court, Lahore, 36, 47.

17. See for example, case of Allah Dad vs. Mukhtar (1992 SCMR 1273).


19. *muhsan*: A Muslim adult man/woman who is not insane and has had sexual intercourse with a Muslim adult woman/man who, at the time he/she had sexual intercourse with her/him, was married to her/him and was not insane.


21. *tazkiyat-u shuhud*: The process of inquiry that the court employs to ascertain the eligibility and standard of a witness, and whether the witness is just or unjust. (Sanaullah vs the State PLD 1991 5C 186).